A Note on Prediction Markets by Dawid, A. Philip & Mortera, Julia
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
02
50
2v
1 
 [m
ath
.ST
]  
8 F
eb
 20
17
A Note on Prediction Markets
A. Philip Dawid∗ Julia Mortera†
September 20, 2018
Abstract
In a prediction market, individuals can sequentially place bets on the outcome of a
future event. This leaves a trail of personal probabilities for the event, each being
conditional on the current individual’s private background knowledge and on the
previously announced probabilities of other individuals, which give partial informa-
tion about their private knowledge. By means of theory and examples, we revisit
some results in this area. In particular, we consider the case of two individuals, who
start with the same overall probability distribution but different private informa-
tion, and then take turns in updating their probabilities. We note convergence of
the announced probabilities to a limiting value, which may or may not be the same
as that based on pooling their private information.
JEL Classification: C53, D8, G14
Some key words: consensus; expert opinion; information aggregation; probability
forecast; sequential prediction
1 Introduction
This paper revisits some of the results appearing in economic literature from a statistical
point of view.
A prediction market – also known as a predictive market, an information market,
a decision market, or a virtual market – is a venue where actors trade predictions on
uncertain future events and can also allow participants to stake bets on the likelihood of
various events occurring. These events include, for example, an election result, a terrorist
attack, a natural disaster, commodity prices, quarterly sales or even sporting outcomes.
Prediction markets also offer trade in possible future outcomes on securities markets, in
which case participants who use it are buying something like a futures contract. The
Iowa Electronic Markets (http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/) of the University of Iowa
Henry B. Tippie College of Business is one of the main prediction markets in operation.
∗Leverhulme Emeritus Fellow, University of Cambridge, UK.
†Universita` Roma Tre, Italy.
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Also companies like Google have setup their own internal prediction markets. Prediction
markets sometimes operate on an open market like the stock market, or in a closed
market akin to a betting pool. A prediction market translates the wisdom of crowds
into predictive probabilities.
For example, suppose that in a prediction market one can bet whether A occurs
(before time t), where actors buy and sell contracts among each other. Let a contract
pay 1 if event A occurs and 0 otherwise. Say, the market price for the contract is 0.58.
Offers to buy and sell are fixed at 0.57 and at 0.59, respectively. Now, you can either
pay 0.59 instantly, or post an offer to pay 0.58 and see if any actor is willing to sell at
that price. Now, the current market price, 0.58, is the consensus probability.
Prediction markets have been studied by Aldous (2013); Arrow et al. (2008); Hanson
(2003); Chen et al. (2010); Hanson et al. (2006); Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2008); Stra¨hl and Ziegel
(2015); Ehm et al. (2016), among others.
2 Basic setup
We shall focus on the opinions of a specific individual, “You”, and how these opinions
change in the light of accumulating experience. Taking a fully Bayesian position, we
suppose that Your opinions are expressed as a joint probability distribution, Pr, over all
relevant variables. Other individuals may have their own probabilities for various events,
but for You these are treated simply as potential data. In the sequel, all probabilities
are computed under Your distribution Pr.
We shall interpret the term “expert” in the sense of DeGroot (1988); Dawid et al.
(1995). That is, an individual E is an expert (for You) if E started with exactly
the same joint probability distribution Pr over all relevant variables as You, and has
observed everything that you have observed, and possibly more. If You now learn (just)
the probability Π that E assigns to some event A, your updated probability for A will
be Π. That is, You will agree with the expert.
In the context of a prediction market, experts E1, E2, . . ., sequentially give their prob-
ability predictions Π1,Π2, . . ., for an uncertain event A. Ei is the expert that makes
the forecast at time i. We allow for the case that it could be the same expert giving
his forecast at different times. At time i expert Ei has access to all previous forecasts
Π1, . . . ,Πi−1, and additional private information Hi. Ei will typically not have access to
the private information sets H1, . . . ,Hi−1 that the previous experts used in formulating
their forecasts, but only to the actual forecasts made. However, in some markets there is
an option for forecasters to leave comments, which could give additional partial informa-
tion Ki (which might be empty) about Hi. We assume that each forecaster is aware of
all such past comments. Thus Πi = Pr(A |Ti), where Ti := (K1,Π1, . . . ,Ki−1,Πi−1,Hi)
is the total information available to Ei.
The full public information available just after time i is Si := (K1,Π1,K2,Π2, . . . ,Ki,Πi).
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Note that Si and Ti both contain all the information made public up to time i−1. They
differ only in the information they contain for time i: here Ti specifies the totality, Hi,
of expert Ei’s information, both public, Ki, and private, whereas Si specifies only Ei’s
public information, Ki, and her announced probability forecast, Πi, for A at time i.
The information sets (Ti) are not in general increasing with i, since Hi is included in
Ti but need not be in Ti+1. The information sets (Si) are however increasing. The
following Lemma and Corollary show that, for You, for the purposes of predicting A
both information sets Ti and Si are equivalent, and Your associated prediction is just
the most recently announced probability forecast.
Lemma 1 Pr(A |Si) = Pr(A |Ti) = Πi.
Proof. Since Ti ⊃ Si ∋ Πi,
Pr(A |Si) = E{Pr(A |Ti) |Si}
= E(Πi |Si)
= Πi
= Pr(A |Ti).
✷
Corollary 1 If You observe the full public information Si, and have no further private
information, Your conditional probability for A is just the last announced forecast Πi.
3 Convergence
From Lemma 1 and the fact that the information sequence (Si) is increasing, we have:
Corollary 2 The sequence (Πi) is a martingale with respect to (Si).
Then by Corollary 2 and the martingale convergence theorem, we now have:
Corollary 3 As i→∞, Πi tends to a limiting value Π∞.
The variable Π∞ is random in the sense that it depends on the initially unknown (to
You) information sequence S∞ := limSi that will materialise, but will be a fixed value
for any such sequence.
A perhaps surprising implication of Corollary 3 is that, eventually, introduction of
new experts will not appreciably change the probability You assign to A — whatever
new private information they may bring will be asymptotically negligible compared with
the accumulated public information. We may term Π∞ the consensus probability of A,
and the information S∞ on which it is based the consensus information set .
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The information S∞ is common knowledge for all experts in the sense of Aumann
(1976). For details See Geanakoplos (1992a,b); Nielsen (1984); McKelvey and Page
(1986).
It might be considered that the limiting value Π∞ has succeeded in integrating all
the private knowledge of the infinite sequence of experts. As we shall see below this is
sometimes, but not always, the case.
4 Two experts
As a special case, suppose we have a finite set of experts, E1, . . . , EN , and we take
EN+1 = E1 (so HN+1 = H1), EN+2 = E2, etc.. Thus we repeatedly cycle through the
experts. Continuing for many such cycles, eventually we will get convergence, to some
Π∞ — at which point each expert will not be changing her opinion based on the total
sequence of publicly announced forecasts, even though she still has access to additional
private information.
At convergence, it will thus make no difference to Expert Ei to incorporate (again)
her private information Hi. Consequently we have:
Proposition 4 For each i, A⊥⊥Hi | S∞.
Dutta and Polemarchakis (2014) give a simple example with two experts, that shows
that the order in which the experts play can matter. In their example they show that
when one of the experts starts playing they reach a complete consensus, whereas chang-
ing the order in which they play they reach a limited consensus. Dutta and Polemarchakis
(2014) also show that if an expert has additional information this can lead to a weaker
consensus. They call this “obfuscation”.
In the sequel we consider in detail the case N = 2 of two experts, who alternate
E1, E2, E1, E2, . . . in updating and announcing their forecasts. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982) have studied this in the case that there is no side-information, and each expert
Ei’s set of possible private information has finite cardinality, Ki say. They show that
exact consensus is reached in at most K1 +K2 rounds.
4.1 Vacuous consensus
We start with some examples where the experts learn nothing from each other’s forecasts—
although they would learn more if they were able to communicate and pool their private
data.
Example 1 Parity check
This example is essentially the same as that described by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982, p. 198).
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Let X1,X2 be independent fair coin tosses. Expert Ei observes only Xi (i = 1, 2).
Let A be the event X1 = X2. This has prior probability 0.5.
On observing his private information X1, whatever value it may take, E1’s prob-
ability of A is unchanged, at 0.5. His announcement of that value is therefore totally
uninformative about the value of X1. Consequently E2 can only condition on her private
information about X2—which similarly has no effect. The sequence of forecasts will thus
be 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, . . .. Convergence is immediate, but to a vacuous state.
However, if the experts could pool their data, they would learn the value of A with
certainty. ✷
Example 2 Bivariate normal
With this example, we generalise from predicting an uncertain event to predicting an
uncertain quantity.
Suppose that E1 observes X1, and E2 observes X2, where (X1,X2) have a bivariate
normal distribution with means E(Xi) = 0, variances var(Xi) = 1, and unknown corre-
lation coefficient ρ—which is what they have to forecast. Let ρ have a prior distribution
Π0. Since X1 is totally uninformative about ρ, E1’s first forecast is again Π0, and so
is itself uninformative. Again, E2 has learned nothing relevant to ρ, and so outputs
forecast Π0; and so on, leading to immediate convergence to a vacuous state. However
the pooled data (X1,X2) is informative about ρ (though does not determine ρ with
certainty). ✷
In the above examples, each expert’s private information was marginally independent
of the event or variable, generically Y say, being forecast, with the immediate result that
the consensus forecast was vacuous, the same as the prior forecast. Conversely, suppose
the consensus is vacuous. That is to say,
Y ⊥⊥S∞. (1)
But from Proposition 4 (trivially generalised) we have
Y ⊥⊥Hi | S∞. (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we obtain Y ⊥⊥ (Hi, S∞) whence, in particular,
Y ⊥⊥Hi.
Hence the consensus will be vacuous if and only if each expert’s private information is,
marginally, totally uninformative. The argument extends trivially to any finite number
of experts.
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4.2 Complete consensus
We use the term complete consensus to refer to the case that the consensus forecast will
be the same as the forecast based on the totality of the private information available to
all the individual forecasters. A simple situation where this will occur is when Πi is a
one-to-one function of Hi, so that, by announcing Πi, expert Ei fully reveals her private
information.
Example 3 Overlapping Bernoulli trials
Let θ be a random variable with a distribution over [0, 1] having full support. Given θ,
let Y0 ∼ B(n0, θ), Y1 ∼ B(n1, θ), Y2 ∼ B(n2, θ), and A ∼ B(1, θ), all independently.
Suppose E1 observes X1 = Y0 + Y1, and E2 observes X2 = Y0 + Y2. At the first
stage, E1 computes and announces Π1 = Pr(A |X1)—which is a one-to-one function of
X1. For example, under a uniform prior distribution for θ, Π1 = (X1+1)/(n0+n1+2).
Then at stage 2, E2 will have learned X1, and also has private information X2. Thus
Π2 = Pr(A | X1,X2), the correct forecast given the complete private information of E1
and E2. Further cycles will not change this probability, which will be the consensus. ✷
Example 4 Linear prediction
Consider variables X = (X1, . . . ,Xk), Z = (Z1, . . . , Zh) and (scalar) Y , all being jointly
normally distributed with non-singular dispersion matrix. Expert 1 observes H1 = X,
Expert 2 observes H2 = Z, and they have to forecast Y . Each time an expert announces
her predictive distribution for Y , she is making known the value of her predictive mean of
Y , which will be some linear combination of the predictor variables (X,Z). So generically
we would expect convergence of the forecasts, after at most min{k, h} rounds, to the
full forecast based on the pooled information (X,Z).
In order to investigate this we have made use of the 93CARS dataset (Lock, 1993),
containing information on new cars for the 1993 model year. There are n = 82 complete
cases with information on 26 variables, including price, mpg ratings, engine size, body
size, and other features. We took X = (X1, . . . ,X11) to be the variables 7 to 17,
Z = (Z1, . . . , Z9) to be the variables 18 to 26, and Y to be variable 5 (Midrange Price).
Let S denote the uncorrected sum-of-squares-and-products matrix based on the data
for these variables. The fictitious model we shall consider for the prediction game has
(X,Z, Y ) multivariate normal, with mean 0 and dispersion matrix Σ = S/n. The
predictive distribution of Y , based on any collection of linear transforms of the X’s and
Z’s, will then be normal, with a mean-formula that can be computed by running the
zero-intercept sample linear regression of Y on those variables, and variance that will
not depend on the values of the predictors. Note that, although our calculations are
based on the sample data, the values computed are not estimates, but are the correct
values for our fictitious model.
Let U1 be the variable so obtained from the sample regression Y onX ≡ (X1, . . . ,X11).
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i: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 . . .
ui: 40.62 39.49 39.34 39.51 39.55 39.54 39.66 39.75 39.73917 39.73925 . . .
vi: 38.28 39.40 39.46 39.54 39.56 39.63 39.67 39.74 39.73924 39.73925 . . .
Table 1: Sequence of market predictions for Y
Recall that both experts are supposed to know the model, hence Σ, and know which
variables each is observing. Consequently both know the form of U1, but initially only
E1, who knows the values of (X1, . . . ,X11), can compute its value, u1 say. Since his
round-1 forecast for Y is normal with mean u1, while its variance is already computable
by both experts, the effect of E1 issuing his forecast is to make the value u1 of U1 public
knowledge.
It is now E2’s turn to play. At this point she knows the values of U1 and (Z1, . . . , Z9),
and her forecast is thus obtained from the sample regression of Y on these variables.
Let this regression function (computable by both experts) be V1; then at this round E2
effectively makes the value v1 of V1 public.
Now at round 2, E1 regresses Y on (X1, . . . ,X11, V1) (U1, which is a linear function of
his privately known X’s, being redundant), and announces the value u2 of the computed
regression function U2. And so on.
The relevant computations are easy to conduct using the statistical software package
R (R Development Core Team, 2011). At each stage, we computed the 82 fitted values
based on the regression just performed. These can then be used as values for the new
predictor variable to be included in the next regression. Moreover, convergence of the
forecast sequence will be reflected in convergence of these fitted values. We observe
this convergence, both for the fitted values and the predicted standard deviations, from
round 10 onwards: as soon as E1 has access to the values of U1, . . . , U9, he effectively
knows Z1, . . . , Z9, and his forecast becomes the same as that based on the pooled data.
And as soon as E1 makes that public, E2 can make the same forecast.
As a numerical illustration, suppose E1 has observed
X = x = (16, 25, 2, 1, 8, 4.6, 295, 6000, 1985, 0, 20.0),
and E2 has observed
Z = z = (5, 204, 111, 74, 44, 31.0, 14, 3935, 1).
Before entering the prediction market, E1’s point forecast for Y , based on his data
X = x, is u1 = 40.6163, and E2’s point forecast for Y , based on her data Z = z, is
v0 = 30.6316. If they could combine their data, the forecast, based on (X,Z) = (x, z),
would be 39.73925.
On entering the market, the sequence of their predictions is as given in Table 1. We
see convergence to the value based on all the data at round 10, by which point E2,
7
having publicly announced the values of 9 predictor variables, has effectively revealed
all her 9-dimensional private information to E1. The predictions of both experts will
stay the same thereafter.
As a second illustration, suppose E1 has observed
X = x = (22, 30, 1, 0, 4, 3.5, 208, 5700, 2545, 1, 21.1),
and E2 has observed
Z = z = (4, 186, 109, 69, 39, 27.0, 13, 3640, 0).
Before entering the prediction market, E1’s point forecast for Y is 27.80968, and E2’s
point forecast is 36.593865. Their market forecasts converge at round 10 to 31.22983,
the forecast based on all the data.
These two cases illustrate within-sequence convergence, but to a random (i.e., data-
dependent) limit. ✷
A similar example for a linear prediction that gives the same basic results was shown
in Dutta and Polemarchakis (2014). They however do not give a numerical illustration.
4.3 Limited consensus
In all the above examples, convergence was either to a vacuous state, or to a complete
consensus based on the totality of the pooled private information. As the following
example shows, it is also possible to converge to an intermediate state.
Example 5 Suppose θ and X1 have independent N(0, 1) distributions, while, given
(θ,X1), X2 ∼ N(θX1, 1). Expert E1 observes H1 = X1, while E2 observes H2 = X2.
The interest is in predicting θ. A sufficient statistic for θ, based on the combined data
(X1,X2), is (X1X2, |X1|) = (S1, S2), say. The posterior distribution is
θ | (S1, S2) = (s1, s2) ∼ N
(
s1
1 + s22
,
1
1 + s22
)
.
Straightforward computations deliver the joint density of (X1,X2), marginalising
over θ:
f(x1, x2) = (2pi)
−1(1 + x21)
− 1
2 exp−
1
2
(
x21 +
x22
1 + x21
)
. (3)
Because (3) is unchanged if we change the sign of either or both of x1 and x2, we deduce
(what may be obvious from the symmetry of the whole set-up):
Proposition 5 Conditionally on |X1| and |X2|, sign(X1) and sign(X2) behave as inde-
pendent fair coin-flips.
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At the first round, E1 declares his posterior for θ, based on X1—but, since X1⊥⊥ θ
this supplies no information at all about θ. (So we would get the same answer if E2
were to go first—the order in which they announce their opinions does not matter.)
Now E2 goes. Since X2 | θ ∼ N(0, 1 + θ
2), with sufficient statistic |X2|, E2 is
effectively putting |X2| into the public pot.
At the start of round 2, E1 knows X1 and |X2|. By Proposition 5, sign(X2) is still
equally likely to be 1 or −1. So E1 knows S2, but only knows |S1|—for him, S1 is either
|S1| or −|S1|, each being equally likely. His posterior is thus a 50–50 mixture of the
associated posteriors
N
(
|S1|
1 + S22
,
1
1 + S22
)
and
N
(
−|S1|
1 + s22
,
1
1 + S22
)
.
OnE1’s now announcing this mixture posterior, he is effectively communicating (|S1|, S2) ≡
(|X1| × |X2|, |X1|). The total information in the public pot is thus now equivalent to
(|X1|, |X2|).
It is now E2’s turn again. At this point she knows (|X1|,X2), so (|S1|, S2)—but still
does not know sign(S1), which again behaves as a coin-flip. Her forecast distribution is
thus exactly the same as E1’s. So we get convergence to the above mixture posterior at
round 2. But this limiting forecast is not the same as that based on the pooled data,
which would be the relevant single component of the mixture.
Note that, at convergence, the pool of public knowledge is (|X1|, |X2|). Since θ has
the identical mixture posterior whether conditioned on (|X1|, |X2|), on (X1, |X2|), or on
(|X1|,X2), we have both θ⊥⊥X1 | (|X1|, |X2|) and θ⊥⊥X2 | (|X1|, |X2|), in accordance
with Proposition 4. ✷
It might appear that the above behaviour is highly dependent on the symmetry
of the problem, but this is not so. As the following analysis shows, the same limited
consensus behaviour arises on breaking the symmetry.
Example 6 Consider the same problem as in Example 5 above, with the sole modifica-
tion that the prior distribution of θ is now N(µ, 1), where µ is non-zero. The posterior
distribution of θ, based on the full data (X1,X2) or its sufficient statistic (S1, S2), is
now
θ | (S1, S2) = (s1, s2) ∼ Π(s1, s2) := N
(
µ+ s1
1 + s22
,
1
1 + s22
)
.
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 6 Given only |S1| = m1, S2 = m2, the posterior distribution is a mixture:
θ ∼M(m1,m2) = pi(1)Π(m1,m2) + pi(−1)Π(−m1,m2) (4)
9
where
pi(j) = P (sign(S1) = j | |S1| = m1, S2 = m2) (j = ±1). (5)
Proposition 7 Conditionally on |X1| and |X2|:
(i). sign(X1)⊥⊥ sign(X1X2)
(ii). sign(X2)⊥⊥ sign(X1X2)
Proof. (i) The joint density of (X1,X2), marginalising over θ, is
f(x1, x2) = (2pi)
−1(1 + x21)
− 1
2 exp−
1
2
(
x21 +
(x2 − µx1)
2
1 + x21
)
.
This is unchanged if we change the signs of both x1 and x2. Consequently, given |X1| =
m1, |X2| = m2, P (X1 = m1,X2 = m2) = P (X1 = −m1,X2 = −m2), while P (X1 =
m1,X2 = −m2) = P (X1 = −m1,X2 = m2). But this is equivalent to
P (sign(X1) = 1, sign(X1X2) = 1) = P (sign(X1) = −1, sign(X1X2) = 1)
P (sign(X1) = 1, sign(X1X2) = −1) = P (sign(X1) = −1, sign(X1X2) = −1).
Thus P (sign(X1) = 1 | sign(X1X2) = 1) = P (sign(X1) = 1 | sign(X1X2) = −1) =
1
2
,
which in particular implies sign(X1)⊥⊥ sign(X1X2).
(ii) We have
P (sign(X2) = 1 | sign(X1X2) = 1) = P (sign(X1) = 1 | sign(X1X2) = 1)
P (sign(X2) = 1 | sign(X1X2) = −1) = P (sign(X1) = −1, sign(X1X2) = −1)
So from (i), conditional on |X1| = m1, |X2| = m2, P (sign(X2) = 1 | sign(X1X2) = 1) =
P (sign(X2) = 1 | sign(X1X2) = −1) =
1
2
so that, in particular, sign(X2)⊥⊥ sign(X1X2).
✷
In the first round, E1 and E2 behave exactly as before, and again, at the start
of round 2, the public pot contains |X2|. So now E1 knows X1 and |X2|. In terms
of the sufficient statistic he knows (|S1|, S2), but does not know sign(S1). Moreover,
by Proposition 7(i), his additional knowledge of sign(X1) contains no relevant further
information about sign(S1). Consequently, he will compute and announce the mixture
posteriorM(|S1|, S2). From this it is possible to deduce the values of |S1| and S2. Hence
at this point the public pot contains (|S1|, S2).
Now E2 knows (|S1|, S2), but is still ignorant of sign(S1). And again, although she
has the additional knowledge of sign(X2), by Proposition 7(ii) this contains no relevant
further information about sign(S1). Consequently, E2 will have the same posterior
distribution M(|S1|, S2), which will be the final (but limited) consensus.
(Note that an essentially identical analysis will hold with any prior distribution for
θ.)
✷
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5 Discussion
We have displayed a variety of behaviours for a process where two experts take it in
turns to update their probability of a future event, conditioning only on the revealed
probabilities of the other. Although there will always be convergence to a limiting value,
this may or may not be the same as what they could achieve if they were able to pool
all their private information.
We have supposed throughout that, although each expert may be unaware of the
private information held by the other, he does at least know which variables the other
expert knows—just not their values. When this cannot be assumed there will be much
greater freedom to update one’s own probability on the basis of the revealed probability
of the other. Nevertheless this freedom is restricted. Some theory relevant to the case
of combining the announced probabilities of a number of experts, without even knowing
the private variables on which these are based, may be found in Dawid et al. (1995). It
would be challenging, but valuable, to extend this to the present sequential case.
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